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In a series of cases over the last few years, the United States Supreme 
Court has invalidated as unconstitutional a succession of federal statutes 
enacted under the Commerce Clause1 of the United States Constitution. 
The Court based these decisions, in part, on the authority of The Federalist. 
In Lopez v. United States,2 the first of the cases to invoke The Federalist, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist stated: 
We start with first principles.  The Constitution creates a Federal 
Government of enumerated powers . . . .  As James Madison wrote, 
“The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the Federal 
Government are few and defined.  Those which are to remain in the 
State governments are numerous and indefinite.”3 
The Court subsequently held that Congress could not, under the Commerce 
Clause, criminalize the mere possession of a firearm in a local school 
district.4 
Two years later, in Printz v. United States,5 the Court struck down a 
federal statute imposing a duty on state and local law enforcement officers 
to conduct background checks on prospective handgun purchasers, as an 
unconstitutional imposition upon state sovereignty.6  The majority 
dismissed the dissent’s argument that the Commerce Clause, when coupled 
with the Necessary and Proper Clause,7 conferred on Congress the power to 
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 1 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian 
Tribes.”). 
 2 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 3 Id. at 552 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 313 (James Madison) [hereinafter THE 
FEDERALIST]). 
 4 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561. 
 5 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 6 See id. at 933. 
 7 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (“Congress shall have Power . . . To make all Laws 
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the [enumerated] Powers, 
and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or 
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adopt this measure.8  In so doing, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, 
relied on Alexander Hamilton’s characterization of the Necessary and 
Proper Clause.9 
In 1999, the Court in Alden v. Maine10 invalidated a statutory 
provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 that authorized 
employee actions against states in their own courts for violating the 
statute’s wage and hour regulations.11  In the majority opinion, Justice 
Kennedy, like Justice Scalia in Printz, followed the Hamilton 
characterization of the Necessary and Proper Clause in The Federalist.12 
The Court’s unquestioning reliance on the authority of The Federalist 
may seem correct.  Hamilton and Madison, who authored almost all of the 
essays, were not only participants at the Constitutional Convention, they 
were political theorists of the highest caliber.  Their statements, therefore, 
would seem to be authoritative.  Yet other considerations point to a 
different conclusion.  In practice, Hamilton systematically ignored The 
Federalist when he assessed the legislative powers of Congress and the 
powers of the presidency.  In those papers, he and Madison had each 
contended that the legislative powers of Congress were limited to those 
enumerated in Article I, Section 8, Clauses 1 through 17; and, under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause in Clause 18, to the incidental execution of 
the powers enumerated in Clauses 1 through 17.  
Specifically, Hamilton wrote that the Necessary and Proper Clause 
merely conferred “the power of employing the means necessary to [an 
enumerated power’s] execution.”13  With Madison, he argued that the 
Constitution would mean the same if the Clause had not been included.14 
Madison wrote that “[n]o axiom is more clearly established in law, or in 
reason, than that wherever the end is required, the means are authorized; 
wherever a general power to do a thing is given, every particular power 
necessary for doing it, is included.”15 
 
in any Department or Officer thereof.”). 
 8 See Printz, 528 U.S. at 923-24. 
 9 See id.  The Court quoted Hamilton’s defense of the Necessary and Proper Clause 
against the charge that it would be utilized by Congress to pass laws not authorized by the 
Constitution.  See id.  Hamilton wrote that such measures “will be merely acts of usurpation 
and will deserve to be treated as such.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 33, at 207 (Alexander 
Hamilton). 
 10 522 U.S. 706 (1999). 
 11 See id. at 712. 
 12 See id. at 732-33. 
 13 THE FEDERALIST NO. 33, at 204 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis in original). 
 14 See id.  Hamilton stated that: “It may be affirmed with perfect confidence, that the 
constitutional operation of the intended government would be precisely the same [if the 
Necessary and Proper Clause was] entirely obliterated.”  Id.   
 15 THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, at 304-05 (James Madison). 
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Hamilton, however, in a report to the House during the third session 
of the First Congress, advocating the establishment of a national bank, gave 
no consideration to the requirement that Congress may only pass a bill that 
comports with one if its enumerated powers.16  Instead, Hamilton focussed 
on the benefits that the bank would bestow.  Such an entity, he explained, 
would, through its circulating privately issued and governmentally 
sanctioned paper credit, create an adequate money supply suitable for the 
commercial and governmental needs of the country.  Circulating bank notes 
serving as a paper currency would displace gold and silver as ordinary 
money.  Thereby they would enable the government to hoard its gold and 
silver for the payment of its foreign debt, help merchants obtain credit and 
start new ventures, and promote commerce.  Finally, Hamilton submitted 
that the bank itself would aid government borrowing in times of 
emergency, and facilitate the payment of the government’s domestic debt. 
But did Congress have the power to establish the bank?  Such an 
institution, with local offices dispersed throughout the thirteen states, could 
have easily been employed in the execution of two of the enumerated 
powers: the collection of taxes and the payment of the government’s 
domestic debt.  In this way, the bank’s charter could have been justified 
under the Necessary and Proper Clause.  The scope of Hamilton’s report, 
however, indicated that, in his view, such a service was a mere detail in a 
much grander plan:  The creation of a national banking system that would 
underwrite and supervise a great national monetary and commercial 
enterprise.  The bank’s operations thus would be in the best interests of the 
country.  Hamilton simply assumed the bill’s constitutionality. 
Madison, however, attacked the constitutionality of the bill during the 
House debate to establish a national bank.  The bill’s provisions, he 
contended, did not fall within any enumerated power, nor could the bank’s 
establishment be justified under the Necessary and Proper Clause.17  When 
Representative James Jackson of Georgia, who supported Madison, cited 
The Federalist as authority for a restrictive meaning for the Clause,18 
Hamilton’s adherents argued for a much more accommodating 
 
 16 See 10 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 305 (Harold C. Syrett & Jacob E. 
Cooke eds., 1961-87) [hereinafter HAMILTON PAPERS].  For a full discussion of Hamilton’s 
views on the necessity for establishing the Bank as the instrument for the creation of a paper 
money supply adequate for the needs of the economy and the government, see Joseph M. 
Lynch, McCulloch v. Maryland: A Matter of Money Supply, 18 SETON HALL L. REV. 223 
(1988). 
 17 See 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 367, 369-71 (Linda 
Grant Depauw et al. eds., 1972) (statement of Rep. Madison) [hereinafter FIRST FEDERAL 
CONGRESS]. 
 18 See id. at 363-64.  (referring to statement of Rep. Jackson); see also THE FEDERALIST 
No. 44, at 304 (James Madison). 
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interpretation.  As Fisher Ames of Massachusetts stated: “[T]hat 
construction [of the Clause] may be maintained to be a safe one which 
promoted the good of society, and the ends for which the government was 
adopted, without impairing the rights of any man, or the powers of any 
State.”19 
Following the bill’s adoption, President George Washington consulted 
his cabinet about the bill’s constitutionality.  Hamilton, as a member of the 
cabinet, was not so bold as to repeat Ames’s contention and write of the 
need to legislate for the good of society and the ends for which the 
government was adopted.  Instead, Hamilton adhered to a more limited 
construction of the Necessary and Proper Clause.  Without referring to The 
Federalist, Hamilton stated: “[I]t will not be contended that the clause in 
question gives any new or independent power.  But it gives an explicit 
sanction to the doctrine of implied powers.”20  When applying this standard 
to the bill, however, Hamilton repeated what he had written in his report 
and what Ames and others had stated in the House: The bank would secure 
for the nation an adequate money supply through the medium of a privately 
issued, governmentally-approved paper currency.  Hamilton proclaimed 
that such privately circulating currency would stimulate commerce and 
accomplish the many benefits he had set forth in his report.21 
The Federalists in the First Congress, then, in the interest of what they 
conceived to be good government, ignored The Federalist’s more narrow 
interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause.  In addition, they 
circumvented the restriction contained in Article I, Section 8, Clause 5, 
which on its face served to limit the creation of money to “coin,” that is, to 
gold and silver.22   
The Federalists were not alone in departing from the construction of 
the Necessary and Proper Clause put forth in The Federalist.  In opposing 
the bill, Madison, in the House, also adopted a construction different from 
that espoused in the publication.  Perhaps mindful that the establishment of 
a national bank might be justified as incidental to the payment of the 
government’s domestic debt, Madison drew a distinction, nowhere 
 
 19 See 14 FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS at 390, 393 (statement of Rep. Ames). 
 20 8 HAMILTON PAPERS 106 (emphasis in original). 
 21 See id. at 121.  While Hamilton argued that each aspect constituted an incidental 
means to the execution of one of the enumerated powers, such as borrowing or regulating 
commerce, only the collection of the government’s taxes and the payment of the 
government’s domestic debt were actually incidental.  See id. 
 22 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5 (“Congress shall have Power . . . To coin Money, 
regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the Standard of Weights and 
Measures.”).  Hamilton considered the issuance of paper money by the federal government 
to be contrary to the spirit of the Constitution in view of its prohibition of the emission of 
paper money by the states.  See 7 HAMILTON PAPERS 321-22 (discussing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 
10, cl. 1). 
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mentioned in The Federalist, between unimportant incidental measures that 
he claimed were authorized under the Clause and important incidental 
measures that were not.  The creation of a corporation, such as a national 
bank, Madison claimed, was an important incidental measure and, 
therefore, was not within the purview of the Clause.23 
Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson in his opinion to Washington also 
drew a new distinction not discussed in The Federalist: between an 
indispensably incidental measure, which he claimed to be authorized by the 
word “necessary” in the Clause, and one not indispensably incidental, 
which was not.24  Ultimately, President Washington ignored the contrary 
 
 23 See 14 FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 372-74 (statement of Rep. Madison).  The 
Constitution, he declared, forbade “the exercise of any power, particularly a great and 
important power, which is not evidently and necessarily involved in an express power.”  Id.  
Astonishingly, he added, such a power was on “necessary and proper for the exercise for the 
government or union.”  Id.   
 24 See 19 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 275, 278-79 (Julian P. Boyd et al. eds., 
1950).  Interestingly, neither Madison nor Jefferson advanced the argument that since a 
national bank in its operations would constitute such a radical transformation of the national 
monetary system, it constituted a means disproportionate to any enumerated end, such as 
paying the domestic debt.  While the establishment of a bank could be considered as an 
appropriate means to the end of initiating a paper monetary system, Article I, Section 8 had 
not provided for it.  Ironically, Hamilton himself in The Federalist may have suggested a 
proportionality test when commenting on the Necessary and Proper Clause.  Hamilton 
wrote: “The propriety of a law in a constitutional light, must always be determined by the 
nature of the powers upon which it is founded.”  THE FEDERALIST No. 33, at 206 (Alexander 
Hamilton).   
The strength in Hamilton’s advocacy of the bank bill’s constitutionality, however, lay 
in its practicality.  At that time only three states had chartered banks.  14 FIRST FEDERAL 
CONGRESS 394 (statement of Rep. Ames).  The bill would remedy that deficiency.  
Envisioning the creation of a national banking system, the bill authorized the Bank’s 
directors to establish branches wherever in the United States it was considered suitable.  1 
STAT. 191, § 15.  Through these branches the Bank could, by the issuance of its paper, 
supply the credit necessary for the conduct of business within the respective districts.  
After the Bank was established and the number of state banks increased, it maintained 
a restraining influence on their extension of credit.  But in 1811 the Bank’s original charter, 
having terminated, was not renewed and the task of providing credit fell exclusively upon 
the state banks.  Thereafter, their numbers increased markedly and in the absence of the 
Bank’s moderating influence, they issued paper without restraint.  Within three years, the 
country fell into fiscal paralysis, with the result that the United States Treasury was 
compelled to announce its inability to service the interest on its debt.  In short, the United 
States of America was in default.  See Lynch, supra note 16, at 268-71.   
In view of these developments, Congress chartered the second Bank of the United 
States.  See Act of Apr. 10, 1816, ch. 44, 3 STAT. 266.  It was the constitutionality of this 
statute which was at issue in McCulloch v. Maryland, wherein it was decided that the statute 
was an appropriate exercise of the Necessary and Proper Clause.  See 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 
316, 413-14. 
In an attempt to distinguish McCulloch, it has been argued that since in that case the 
Bank’s opponents did not raise the issue of the propriety of the Bank’s establishment under 
the Necessary and Proper Clause, but merely its necessity, the former issue remains open.  
See Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The “Proper” Scope of Federal Power: A 
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arguments of Madison, Jefferson, and Edmund Randolph, his attorney 
general,25 and signed the bill into law.26 
Both sides of the debate over the bank bill were therefore willing to 
disregard the authority of The Federalist.  The Federalists disregarded The 
Federalist in order to broaden the Necessary and Proper Clause, and to 
enable them to legislate in the best interest of the nation; their opponents, 
the soon to be self-styled Republicans, so as to confine Congress to the 
most narrow interpretation of the clause. 
During the Fifth Congress, the Federalists also ignored the limits of 
congressional legislative powers, as propounded in The Federalist, when 
enacting the Alien and Sedition Laws.  Rejecting the Republican view that 
 
Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267, 327 n. 244 (1993). 
Yet, there can be no doubt that had the issue been raised, the Court in McCulloch 
would have upheld the propriety of the Bank’s creation as well as its necessity under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause.  A contrary ruling would eventually have brought about a 
return to the conditions which in 1814 had plunged the country into financial crisis and 
moved Congress to renew the charter of the Bank of the United States.   
This was confirmed in Osborn v. United States Bank , 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 740-41 
(1824), in which the Court, striking down a taxed imposed on the Bank by the State of Ohio, 
reaffirmed its holding in McCulloch.  As Justice Johnson noted in his dissenting opinion in 
Osborn, the termination of the first Bank of the United States had led to a rage for the 
multiplication of state banks, which “soon inundated the country with a new description of 
bills of credit, against which it was obvious that the provisions of the constitution opposed 
no adequate inhibition.”  Id. at 873.  He proceeded to describe the essential role the second 
Bank of the United States played in the regulation of the nation’s monetary system: 
A specie-paying Bank, with an overwhelming capital, and the whole aid of 
the government deposits, presented the only resource to which the 
government could resort, to restore that power over the currency of the 
country, which the framers of the constitution evidently intended to give to 
Congress alone.  But this necessarily involved a restraint upon individual 
cupidity, and the exercise of State power; and, in the nature of things, it was 
hardly possible for the mighty effort necessary to put down an evil spread so 
wide, and arrived to such maturity, to be made without embodying against it 
an immense moneyed combination, which would not fail of making its 
influence to be felt, wherever its claimances could reach or its industry and 
wealth be brought to operate.   
Id. 
The second Bank of the United States, then, was created to reestablish national control 
over the country’s money supply.  Just as the Court had disregarded the Madison and 
Jefferson gloss on the meaning of “necessary,” it would have done the same with a Lawson 
and Granger gloss on the meaning of “proper.”  If the Bank was “necessary,” its propriety 
had to follow. 
Where no individual state is competent to act, the United States under the Necessary 
and Proper Clause must have the authority to act.  That is what the Court in McCulloch and 
in Osborn decided.  And that is what Madison also decided when in 1816, as President of 
the United States, he was presented with the bill to reestablish the second Bank of the 
United States.  He signed the bill.   
 25 See LEGISLATIVE AND DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES, 
86-89 (Matthew St. Clair Clarke & D. A. Hall eds., 1832). 
 26 See Act of Feb. 25, 1791, ch. 10, 1 STAT. 191. 
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Congress lacked the authority to deport aliens or to protect the federal 
government from seditious speech or writing, because neither power had 
been enumerated in Article I, Section 8, Federalists again invoked the good 
of the country and relied, in part, on the Necessary and Proper Clause.27   
Additionally, Hamilton and the Federalists ignored the limits on the 
power of Congress to spend for the general welfare of the country,28 as 
expressed in The Federalist.  There Madison asserted that Congress could 
spend only for the purposes subsequently enumerated in the section.29  In a 
report to the Second Congress, however, Hamilton advocated a much 
broader scope for the general welfare provision when he supported a 
federal subsidy for manufacturing.30  Responding to Hamilton, Madison, in 
the House, repeated the position he had taken in The Federalist.31 
Hamilton was not the first person to urge on Congress a liberal 
interpretation of the general welfare provision.  Addressing the second 
session of the First Congress, and going far beyond what Hamilton would 
recommend to the Second Congress, President Washington requested 
subsidies for agriculture, commerce, manufacturing, science, literature, and 
institutions of higher learning.32  Later, in his final address to Congress 
during the second session of the Fourth Congress, President Washington 
called for an agricultural subsidy.33  In sum, the Federalists, during the first 
twelve years of the new government, a period in which their influence in 
Congress and in the administration was predominant, consistently 
advocated a broad construction of the Article I powers of Congress, a 
position markedly in contrast with that expressed in The Federalist. 
Similarly, during this period, the Federalists, despite The Federalist, 
supported the exercise of broad discretionary presidential powers under 
Article II of the Constitution, particularly in the formulation and execution 
of foreign policy.  In The Federalist, Hamilton, defending the Constitution 
against the charge that because it provided for a nationally elected 
presidency it was creating a monarchy, had posited strict limits upon 
 
 27 See generally 9 DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 
(Joseph Gales ed., 42 vols., 1834-56) [hereinafter DEBATES].  As further justification of the 
power to remove aliens, the Federalists relied, in part, on the guarantee to protect the states 
from invasion under Article IV, Section 4 of the Constitution.  See id. 
 28 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“Congress shall have the power To . . . pay the debts 
and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States.”). 
 29 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 41, at 277-78 (James Madison). 
 30 See 10 HAMILTON PAPERS 302-04, 310. 
 31 See 3 DEBATES 386-89 (statement of Rep. Madison). 
 32 See 3 FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 252-53 (reporting President Washington’s message 
to Congress). 
 33 See 6 DEBATES 1592, 1594-95 (reporting President Washington’s message to 
Congress). 
   
2000]  FEDERALISTS AND THE FEDERALIST 25 
executive conduct.34  Accordingly, he wrote that the power of the President 
to receive foreign ambassadors and public ministers, as specified in Article 
II, Section 3, was “more a matter of dignity than of authority . . . without 
consequence in the administration of the government.”35 
In 1793, however, during the crisis provoked by the outbreak of war 
between France and Great Britain, Hamilton ignored those remarks and 
instead argued for a broad presidential discretion, without the need to 
consult Congress, in the initiation and execution of foreign policy.  Indeed, 
in his zeal to expand the scope of presidential prerogatives, he went so far 
as to cite the very power of the President to receive foreign ambassadors 
and public ministers as a specific constitutional expression of an overall 
executive preeminence in matters affecting foreign policy.36 We may 
assume that President Washington, the “Federalist-in-Chief,” was not 
displeased with Hamilton’s advocacy of his implied powers.  
Hamilton was not alone in ignoring what had earlier been written in 
The Federalist with respect to the constitutional powers of the President.  
The publication assured that the President’s power to remove officers 
whose appointment had, pursuant to the provisions of Article II, Section 2, 
Clause 2, required the advice and consent of the Senate, would also require 
senatorial consent.37  In the first session of the First Congress, however, 
Madison, contradic ting that assurance, asserted that the President had the 
inherent power under Article II to remove the Secretary of State, whose 
appointment required the consent of the Senate, without the necessity of 
such consent.  When those opposing the proposal cited The Federalist to 
justify their position, Madison simply ignored it.  Sound governmental 
practice, he asserted, required the recognition of his proposition.38  His 
willingness to disregard a position that The Federalist had espoused the 
very year before the debate evidences his belief that the essays were not 
authoritative.  On that point, at least, Hamilton, we can be sure, agreed with 
him. 
If the essays in The Federalist are not authoritative, how should they 
be regarded?  Spencer Roane, the Chief Judge of the Virginia Court of 
Appeals, answered this question in Hunter v. Martin, Devisee of Fairfax.39  
The issue before the court was whether Congress had the constitutional 
 
 34 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, at 462 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 35 Id.  
 36 See 15 HAMILTON PAPERS 37, 55-63. 
 37 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 77, at 515-16 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 38 See 11 FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 845-47 (statement of Rep. Madison). 
 39 18 Va. (4 Munf.) 1 (1815).  The name of the parties may sound familiar.  That is 
because this action formed the lower court record for the landmark decision of the United 
States Supreme Court in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). 
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authority to enact Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which 
authorized an appeal to the Supreme Court from a final judgment of the 
highest state court deciding against a claim purportedly arising under a 
federal statute or treaty.  Martin, claiming title to realty under a federal 
treaty, successfully appealed to the Supreme Court from a prior decision of 
the Virginia court that denied his claim.40  On remand, however, the state 
court instead of obeying the Supreme Court’s mandate, belatedly 
questioned the constitutionality of Section 25 and thus the Supreme Court’s 
jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from its own prior decision.41 
Martin, in defense of Section 25, relied on The Federalist.42  But the 
Virginia court, brushing The Federalist aside, held the statute 
unconstitutional.43  Chief Judge Roane dismissed the notion out of hand 
that The Federalist constituted controlling authority: 
With respect to the work styled “the Federalist,” while it’s [sic] general 
ability is not denied, it is liable to the objection, of having been a mere 
newspaper publication, written in the heat and hurry of the battle, (If I 
may so express myself), before the constitution was adopted.  Its 
principal reputed author was, an active partizan [sic] of the constitution, 
and a supposed favourer of a consolidated government.44 
Judge Roane also added: 
Whatever weight may be attached to the contemporaneous exposition, 
in other cases, little credit is certainly due to the construction of those, 
who were parties to the conflict, and which were given before the heat 
of the contest had subsided, or their passions had time to cool: and as to 
the advantages supposed to have been gained, from their having formed 
the constitution, which is expounded, that circumstance is in entire 
conflict with the principle, deemed vitally important to free 
government, by all enlightened writers, “The Federalist” not excepted, 
that the power of making and expounding a law, or constitution, should 
 
 40 See Fairfax’s Devisee v. Hunter’s Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603 (1812).  Section 25 
provides: 
That a final judgment or decree in any suit, in the highest court of law or equity of a State in 
which a decision in the suit could be had, where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty 
or statute of . . . the United States, and the decision is against their validity; or . . . the 
decision is against the title, right, privilege, or exemption specially set up or claimed . . . 
under such . . . treaty [or] statute . . . may be re-examined and reversed or affirmed in the 
Supreme Court of the United States upon a writ of error. 
Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, § 25. 
 41 See Hunter, 18 Va. (4. Munf.) at 3. 
 42 See id. at 10. 
 43 See id. at 7 (Cabell, J.); see id. at 25 (Brooke, J.); see id. at 54 (Roane, C.J.); see id. at 
58 (Fleming, J.). 
 44 Id. at 27-28.  Judge Roane referred to Hamilton and his advocacy of a broad 
construction of the general welfare provision in the Spending Clause.  See id. at 28. 
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not be blended in the same hands.45 
The views expressed in The Federalist, therefore, were not authoritative, 
and indeed, in light of the fact that they were given in order to induce 
ratification, might be suspect.  Judge Roane’s animus on this point, 
however, may be attributed to the fact that, as a member of the Virginia 
convention, he had joined with Patrick Henry and voted against 
ratification.46 
Judge Roane’s sentiments were anticipated during the House 
discussions about the bank bill.  Representative Elbridge Gerry of 
Massachusetts, speaking in favor of the bill, also dismissed arguments 
against its constitutionality based on statements made and assurances given 
during ratification.  Such statements, Gerry claimed, were made only to 
obtain ratification, and should not therefore be regarded as the speakers’ 
genuine sense of what the text meant.  Representative Gerry stated that: 
[T]he union was at that time divided into two great parties, one of 
which feared the loss of the union, if the constitution was not ratified 
unconditionally, and the other the loss of our liberties, if it was.  The 
object on either side was so important, as perhaps to induce the parties 
to depart from candor. . . . Under such circumstances the opinions of 
great men ought not to be considered as authorities . . . .47 
 Gerry’s brutal candor was more delicately expressed by Judge Roane, 
but the thrust of their remarks is the same: The opinions expressed in The 
Federalist were not authoritative.  Moreover, their remarks were borne out 
by the statements that Hamilton, President Washington, and their Federalist 
supporters in Congress made when they disregarded words Hamilton had 
expressed before ratification.  To a lesser extent, the Gerry and Roane 
remarks were also confirmed by the positions that Madison adopted during 
the debates on the bank bill and on his own bill to confer upon the 
President the power to remove the Secretary of State without the consent of 
the Senate.  In those instances, Madison also disregarded what had been 
written in The Federalist with respect to the scope of the Necessary and 
Proper Clause and the powers of the Presidency.  To use Gerry’s test, the 
 
 45 Id. at 29.  Despite Judge Roane’s opposition, the United States Supreme Court did 
follow the line taken by Hamilton in The Federalist: That the need for the uniform 
construction of a federal statute or treaty required the appealability of state court judgements 
to the United States Supreme Court in cases involving such a construction.  See Martin, 14 
U.S. at 347; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 82, at 555-56 (stating that “the Constitution in 
direct terms, gives an appellate jurisdiction to the Supreme Court in all the enumerated cases 
of federal cognizance”).  Nevertheless, Justice Story’s opinion for the Court did not cite The 
Federalist as authority. 
 46 See 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 
1537-42 (Merrill Jensen et al. eds.). 
 47 14 FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 459-60 (statement of Rep. Gerry). 
  
28 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:18 
genuine, or at least the more genuine, sense of how Hamilton and Madison 
thought the Constitution ought to be construed is to be deduced from the 
words they spoke and the positions they assumed after the Constitution was 
ratified, and not before.   
 Applying Gerry’s test, we should afford no weight to what Hamilton 
wrote in The Federalist regarding the extent of congressional power and, 
within the federal government, presidential power.  Rather, we should 
consider his genuine conviction to reside in the words he wrote and the 
positions he took following his entry into the federal government. 
Contrary to what Justice Scalia wrote in Printz, and what Justice 
Kennedy wrote in Alden, neither Hamilton nor the Federalists genuinely 
regarded the Necessary and Proper Clause as meaning “little or nothing.”48  
The Federalists considered the clause as authority for Congress to legislate 
in the best interests of the nation: Only Congress could establish a national 
banking system and only Congress could protect national security through 
the deportation of aliens and the proscription of sedition. 
Likewise, we can conclude that following ratification Madison 
advocated limits on the legislative powers of Congress stricter than those 
he had advocated in The Federalist, and that he ignored The Federalist 
when its position contravened his own concerning the constitutional extent 
of presidential power.  Nevertheless, it is fair to say that Madison 
consistently contended for a strict construction of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause and of the general welfare provision in the Spending Clause.  Chief 
Justice Rehnquist was, therefore, correct in Lopez when he quoted 
Madison’s words in The Federalist that referred to the legislative powers of 
congress as “few and defined.”49  Chief Justice Rehnquist’s assumption that 
Madison’s views concerning the first principles of the Constitution 
coincided with those of his Federalist contemporaries, such as Hamilton, 
Washington and Ames, however, is simply not correct.   
In fact, neither the country nor the Court itself has followed 
Madison’s lead.  As discussed above, the Court upheld the power of 
Congress to establish a national bank.50  Later, the Court sustained 
congressional power to deport aliens,51 and the power to protect the federal 
government against seditious speech and literature, provided that the 
legislation was consistent with the protection afforded under the First 
 
 48 See supra notes 5-12 and accompanying text (discussing Printz v. United States, 521 
U.S. 898 (1997) and Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999)). 
 49 See supra note 3 (discussing Lopez v. United States, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)). 
 50 See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819). 
 51 See Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889) (The Chinese Exclusion Case); 
see also Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 705-14 (1893). 
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Amendment.52  Of course, the Court has also approved the power of 
Congress to spend for purposes not enumerated in Article I, Section 8.53 
Anomalously, although Madison has not been followed in fact, his 
ideas prevail in theory.  This is largely because the statements that Madison 
and Hamilton made in The Federalist have been taken at face value.  It is 
time for constitutional interpreters to rediscover the forgotten history of the 
first twelve years of the country and to give no more deference to the 
constructions espoused in The Federalist than did the first Federalists or, 
on occasion, Madison and his fellow Republicans.  In that event, the 
Supreme Court would abandon Hamilton’s opinion in that publication 
regarding the Necessary and Proper Clause and federal legislative powers, 
as it has already abandoned Madison’s opinion in The Federalist regarding 
the scope of the general welfare provision in the Spending Clause.   
Instead, the Court should fashion a construction of federal power truly 
consistent with the Federalists’ philosophy.  To repeat the words of Fisher 
Ames during the debate over the bill to establish a national bank: “[T]hat 
construction [of the Necessary and Proper Clause] may be maintained to be 
a safe one which promotes the good of the society, and the ends for which 
the government was adopted, without impairing the rights of any man, or 
the powers of any State.”54  This construction is, in fact, reasonably close to 
the proposal drafted by Madison and offered at the start of the 
Constitutional Convention, whereby Congress would be authorized to pass 
laws “in all cases in which the separate States are incompetent, or in which 
the harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of 
individual legislation.”55 
Why Virginia abandoned this proposal and why a similar one, 
approved by the Convention over Virginia’s opposition and referred to 
committee, disappeared from view, and why the Necessary and Proper 
Clause was substituted in its stead, what all this entailed, and what it should 
now mean is discussed in great detail elsewhere.56 
 
 
 52 See Brandenburg  v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969); Dennis v. United States, 341 
U.S. 494, 501 (1951); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
 53 See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65-66 (1936); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 
619, 640-41 (1937). 
 54 See supra note 19 and accompanying text (discussing statements of Fisher Ames). 
 55 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 21 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 
1996). 
 56 See JOSEPH M. LYNCH ,  NEGOTIATING THE CONSTITUTION: THE EARLIEST DEBATES 
OVER ORIGINAL INTENT 4-26 (1999). 
